Global and Jihad and the Battle for the Soul of Islam by Bendle, Mervyn F
Volume 16, Number 2 125 
Global and Jihad and the Battle for the 
Soul of Islam 
Mervyn F. Bendle 
James Cook University 
The violence of the present global crisis tends to obscure another 
battle that is presently underway within Islam, one "for the soul of 
the world's Muslims" (Schwartz, 2002: I 63). While the primary focus 
of much current research concerns the threat of the Islamist call to 
'Global Jihad', these movements are also seeking to impose a 
purified Islam universally across the Muslim world They are 
targeting popular forms of Islam, Sufi mysticism, and the many 
diverse forms of traditional Islam that have existed for centuries 
across the globe. Given the significance of these religious 
phenomena, and especially Sufism, this is a battle with major 
implications for the future of Islam and the religious history of the 
world This paper describes and assesses this situation and identifies 
some implications for the contemporary study of Islam. 
Introduction 
The warfare, terrorism and violence that characterizes the present global crisis 
tends to obscure another battle that is presently underway within Islam, one that 
may have a far greater long-term impact. At the same time that Osama bin Laden, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Islamist terrorist leaders were issuing their 'fatwa' 
calling for a "Global Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" (Rubin and Rubin, 2002: 
149ff.), another battle was underway. This battle has been described as "a historic 
combat for the soul of the world's Muslims" (Schwartz, 2002:163; cf. Pipes, 
2002: 27). 
Discussion of its various aspects can now be found in many recent studies of 
contemporary Islam, especially where the focus is on Islamism and related 
movements such as Wahhabism (e.g., Abuza, 2002; Ali, 2002; Benjamin and 
Simon, 2002; Bergin, 2001; Esposito, 2002; Gunaratna, 2002; Hiro, 2002; Kepel, 
2002; Lewis, 2003; Murphy, 2002; Paz, 2002; Pipes, 2002; Rashid, 2001, 2002; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2002; Ruthven, 2002; Schwartz, 2002; Zeidan, 2001). While 
the primary focus of many of these works is on the national security threat that 
such movements represent to global order or the interests of the USA and the West 
(Kauppi, 1998), they also record another conflict. This is the battle being waged 
by those Muslims pursuing an ideal of a radically purified Islam; mobilized as a 
militant political force to be imposed universally across the Muslim world and 
beyond. Aside from the corrupting influences of modernity and the West, its 
targets are the popular fonns of Islamic religiosity, represented above al~ by 
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Sufism and the many diverse forms of traditional Islam that have existed across 
the globe for centuries. Given the significance of this religiosity, and especially 
the importance of Sufism, this is an epoch defining battle with major implications 
for the future of Islam and therefore potentially for the future religious history of 
the world. 
Global Jihad 
This conflict is occurring at a time of enormous theological and ideological 
flux and introspection within Islam, a period of resurgence when the perennial 
traditions of renewal and reform (tajdid and islah) are once again re-asserting 
themselves. Central to this is the invocation of the principle of 'independent 
analysis' (ijtihad) by those claiming the status of mujtahids, figures empowered to 
challenge the presiding tradition of Islamic teachings and jurisprudence (taqlid). 
This facilitates "a potentially revolutionary type of thought or movement that, at 
the same time, remains rooted within the Islamic perspective," albeit one 
interpreted in the most literal way (Vol 1, 1983: 40-1 ). As a result, contemporary 
"Islamic discourse [has] assumed a great number of interpreting functions" across 
the Muslim world, and the 1990s witnessed the emergence of"a broad spectrum of 
Islamic interpretations whose only common denominator was the use of a 
repertoire of symbols and concepts handed down by Islam," to construct 
competing visions oflslam (Schulze, 2000: 281). 
Increasingly central to this repertoire is the notion of Global Jihad, which has 
been appropriated by various groups and individuals, responding to the Islamist 
call. As one of its main ideologues, Omar Abu Omar (aka Abu Qutadah) has 
stated, its goal is a future world "totally controlled by Islam." (quoted in Paz, 
2002: 69). Aside from the USA, Israel and Europe, its targets are also the "evil, 
heretic regimes in the apostate countries" of the Muslim world (68). It is "a 
movement of Salafi worldview, perceptions, doctrines, and way ... totally cleansed 
from any remains ofthe wrong Sufi doctrine" (69). As John Esposito (2002: 157) 
observes, jihad has become "the common symbol and rallying cry for holy and 
unholy wars." It is all-encompassing: "resistance and liberation struggles and 
militant jihads, holy and unholy wars, are all declared to be jihads .. . individuals 
and groups, religious and lay, seize the right to declare and legitimate unholy wars 
in the name oflslam." (157) 
This phenomenon reflects various interrelated factors. (1) A shift to the 
internationalization of conflict following the failure of revolutionary and 
nationalist movements within individual Muslim states. (2) The rise of virulent 
anti-Western and particularly anti-American and anti-Jewish views throughout the 
Muslim world. (3) The Islamist denunciation of "so-called moderate Islam ... that 
accepts submission to America and the West, and is glad to live in accordance 
with their [Western] way oflife" (Paz, 2002:70) (4). The ascendency of a dualistic 
view of the world, based on "absolute Manichaean binary dichotomies such as 
God vs. Satan; Truth vs. Falsehood; Light vs. Darkness; and Good vs. Evil. ... 
By labelling everything in the modem West ... as satanic and evil, extremists tum 
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them into legitimate targets for violent attacks." (Zeidan, 2001; 29) (5) The 
collapse of the Soviet bloc and the socialist ideal as a viable path forward for the 
Muslim world. (6) The comparatively open, liberal and tolerant attitude of most 
Western governments, which relieves jihadists operating within their borders of 
the threat of the draconian security attention that they would face in their own 
homelands (Dershowitz, 2002). (7) Increased access to international travel and 
migration coupled with the revolutionary transformation of the global fmancial, 
media, and telecommunications systems, especially involving the Internet (Levitt, 
2002). (8) The rapid spread of print culture in the Muslim world since the 
nineteenth century and the consequent "democratization of Islamic knowledge" 
(Robinson, 1996: 246), that has allowed lay Islamist intellectuals like Mawlana 
Abul Ala Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb to achieve enormous 
influence. (9) The relative ignorance of young Muslims regarding key aspects of 
their faith, which allows them "to accept claims that certain heretical ideas [are] 
actually the only proper form of Islam" (Paz, 2002: 68). Consequently, concepts 
otherwise synonymous with terrorism such as jihad and suicidal martyrdom "are 
now viewed by many in the Islamic world as religious duties." (71) 
These last points are associated with the ascendancy of the notions of tajdid, 
islah, and ijtihad noted above, and are also closely linked to the disproportionate 
influence of the militant ideologies of well-resourced Wahhabi and lslamist 
groups. Here it may be noted that many lslamists (eg., members of Al Qaeda) 
come from technical backgrounds, such as engineering, and they "seek in holy 
texts the same rigour and absence of ambiguity they expect to find in technical 
manuals." (Ruthven, 2000: 387) This literalism requires a radical reduction of the 
subtlety and nuances of Islamic texts (to which properly trained exegetes would be 
alert) to little more than a manual of procedures or a list of instructions. 
Effectively, this literalistic positivism negates "the original spirit of ijtihad,. which 
was based on recognition that texts could never yield absolute certainty in the 
search for truth." (387) 
Wahhabism and the Eclipse of Sufism 
None of this struggle is occurring in a vacuum, of course. Indeed, after two 
centuries of struggle, a great challenge continues to face all the competing groups 
promoting their various formulations of Islam within this fiercely contested 
discursive space. This is the need to establish the meaning of Western hegemony, 
modernity, and now globalization for the Muslim world. Various political and 
ideological responses to this were explored in the latter half of the twentieth 
century (e.g., modernization, secularization, socialism, nation-state nationalism, 
pan-Arab nationalism, pan-lslamism, anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism, and 
Islamism) but one outcome of enormous significance now seems to be assured. 
This outcome can be summarized as follows: increasing numbers of the 
expanding urban Muslim masses and their political leadership are turning from 
secularist models to militant religious reformulations of Islam while 
simultaneously rejecting the great mystical traditions of Islam, represented above 
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all by Sufism: "There has been one clear loser in this age of revolution: it is the 
mystical understanding of the faith .... The realm in which the spiritual knowledge 
of Islam could flourish has shrivelled." (Robinson, 1996a: 246) "For three 
generations and more, the Sufis have been blamed throughout the Near and Middle 
east for centuries of stagnation in the Muslim world, and they have incurred 
hostility from many sides." (Ed-Din, 1985: 237) This is an outcome found on 
both the modernist and Islamist sides of the struggle over the future of Islam: 
"Irrespective of ideological or social differences, the Islamic political public [has] 
almost unanimously turned against popular mysticism, in fact mystical culture 
was in many respects considered as the expression of an altogether negative 
tradition that had to be discarded," if modernity and globalization were going to 
be effectively engaged by the Muslim world (Schulze, 2000: II). 
In the vanguard of this campaign is Islamism and especially Wahhabism, the 
theological worldview of the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia, numerically a 
relatively small tendency within Islam (Ruthven, 2002: 177), whose enormous 
fmancial support from the Saudi regime nevertheless gives it the capacity to 
aggressively compete with other forms of Islam throughout the Muslim world and 
in the West. Its iconoclasm extends beyond mysticism to the popular and 
indigenous Muslim traditions within which these mystical tendencies are 
embedded. As John Esposito (2002: 108) has recently noted: "Much as Saudi 
armies destroyed major Shii shrines in the nineteenth century, Saudi agencies have 
been responsible for the destruction or reconstruction" of innumerable examples of 
Muslim popular and indigenous religiosity. 
Wahhabism was founded in central Arabia by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703-92), who deployed the principle of ijtihad to call for Islamic 
revival based on a rigorous monotheism, a strict orthopraxy and a vision of purity 
and order that was believed to characterize the age of The Prophet. ij:e formed an 
alliance with a local chieftain, Muhammad ibn Sa'ud that has lasted to the present 
day and shapes the political and religious life of Saudi Arabia. The iconoclastic 
program ofWahhabism was all-encompassing: 
It rejected the corruption and laxity of the contemporary decline. It 
rejected too the accommodations and cultural richness of the medieval 
empire. It rejected the introvert warmth and otherworldly piety of the 
mystic way. It rejected also the alien intellectualism not only of 
philosophy but of theology. It rejected all dissensions, even the now 
well-established Shi'ah.(Smith, 1957: 49) 
The reformist program of Wahhabism was equally straightforward and 
un<;ompromising: 
It insisted solely on the Law. The classical Law, said the Wahhabis, is the 
sum and substance of the faith - and that in its straitest, most rigid, 
Hanbali version, stripped of all innovation developed through the 
intervening centuries. Obey the pristine Law, fully, strictly, singly; and 
establish a society where that Law obtains. This, they preached, is Islam: 
all else is superfluous and wrong.(Smith, 1957: 49) 
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Smith (1957: 50) offers a key insight into the Wahhabi form of sectarianism: 
"Theirs was not a pure idealism in the Western sense: devotion to a transcendent 
concept, of which all human implementations are necessarily partial and 
inadequate. This is too Platonic, too Christian." Such a transcendentalist approach 
implicitly accommodated slippage in the realm of religious observance and 
compromised the integrity of Muslim orthopraxy. It was also seen as implicated 
in the seemingly endless philosophical and theological debates that had been 
condemned by the intellectual forefather of Wahhabism, Taqiy al Din Ibn 
Taymiyah (1262-1328), for whom "the source of all religious truth ... is the 
Quran, supplemented by the Hadith and interpreted by the Companions of the 
Prophet or their immediate Successors. The authority of those early scholars, 
confirmed by consensus is infallible." (Fakhry, 1997: 102) Moreover, no 
subsequent generations "can lay claim to infallibility, as the centuries of 
[inconclusive] controversy in theology, philosophy and mysticism actually 
demonstrate." (102) Moreover, since the early generations had addressed all the 
issues that could conceivable concern a truly Islamic community, Ibn Taymiyah 
believed that "any opinions or practices that have emerged subsequently should be 
declared innovations or heresies." (l 02) 
Consequently, for the Wahhabis, the single, authoritative source of 
inspiration was the Quran and the sunna - the Quran as implemented, but not as it 
was implemented actually in history by diverse Muslim communities as they 
struggled to accommodate their faith to their different lives and indigenous 
traditions. Repulsed by what they saw as compromise and corruption, the 
Wahhabis followed Ibn Taymiyah in aspiring to a vision of their faith as they 
believed it was implemented originally in the time of The Prophet and the first 
two generations, that is; implemented in the world in its purist and most ideal 
form: 
Islam for Muslims is not an abstract idea but an idea in operative practice. 
The Wahhabis rejected the actual practice [of Islam as it has unfolded in 
history], but not the conception that Islam is a practice, is essentially a 
divine pattern in this-worldly, historical motion. Their message was a way 
of proclaiming that what is ultimately right and imperative is not the 
actual embodiment of Islam in history but the ideal embodiment. (Smith, 
1957: 50) 
In addition to this insistence on orthopraxy, Wahhabism also practiced the 
controversial Kharijite principle of takjir, or the excommunication of fellow 
Muslims for unbelief. Wahhabism also extended the concept of jahiliyya (the 
willful pagan ignorance that characterized the pre-Islamic societies) to 
contemporary Muslim societies, and in this preceded later Islamist ideologues, 
including the Pakastani, Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-79) and the Egyptian, Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-66), who made such notions central to their critiques of contemporary 
Muslim societies. 
Viewed within the frequently tragic and demoralizing history of modem 
Islam, this Wahhabi reaction to perceived decadence, and their aspirations towards 
a purity of practice can perhaps be comprehended, as can its attraction for many 
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Muslims today. However, as the behaviour of Wahhabi-influenced regimes, 
including the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamists in the Sudan, has revealed 
so vividly, and as aspects of the Saudi regime itself also indicate, the outcome of 
such sectarianism is a theocratic authoritarianism that can be frequently brutal, 
corrupt, and fanatical, and even tend towards the totalitarian as it seeks to 
intervene increasingly in every aspect oflife. 
As evidence of such outcomes the scholars noted above variously cite the 
Wahhabi hatred of Shi'ism, Sufis, infidels, apostates, moderate Muslims, 
mysticism, philosophy, music, the worship of saints, adoration of the Prophet, 
heresy, idolatry, popular religious piety, the 'immodesty' of women, superstitions 
and religious innovations, intellectuals, other religions and the West. Bassam Tibi 
(2001: 44), sees Wahhabism as an "archaic, static and purist interpretation of Islam 
that sees every innovation as a threat to its existential frame of reference," as it 
pursues its vision of a universalized Islam. Malise Ruthven (2002: 172) describes 
it as "that version of the faith that insists on the strict observance of outward rules 
of behaviour (orthopraxy) whilst systematically attacking or undermining the more 
esoteric or mystical variants of the faith that tend towards widening the religion's 
appeal whilst facilitating accommodations with modernity." Vincent Cornell 
(1999: 89) has observed "how the 'mystical interpretations of Sufism . .. have 
recently been replaced and even anathematized by the hadith-driven scripturalism 
ofWahhabism." In another assessment, Wahhabism is seen as totalitarian, utterly 
xenophobic and embodying "a program for the ruthless conquest of power and a 
war of extermination against 'the other', Islamic as well as Judeo-Christian." 
(Schwartz, 2002: 179-80) Ultimately, in its most extreme forms, Wahhabism is a 
death cult that "exalts and promotes death in every element of its existence .... The 
war against terrorist W ahhabism is therefore a war to the death" ( 180). 
Sufism and various popular forms of Muslim religiosity are the primary 
targets ofWahhabism as it pursues its ideal of a purified Islam. These traditional 
forms oflslam are exemplified by a vast array of unique and traditional practices, 
rituals and observances that historically have prevailed throughout the Muslim 
world (Lapidus, 2002; Nasr, 1991; Robinson, 1996; Schwartz, 2002). Indeed, it is 
the Wahhabi antipathy towards such diversity that makes "the battle between Sufis 
and Wahhabis" exemplary of what is at stake in this increasingly intense and one-
sided war "for the soul of Islam." (Schwartz, 2002:241) 
Ironically, the mystical and ascetic practices and beliefs that lie at the heart of 
Sufism and that attract the ire of the Wahhabis and other Islamists go back to the 
very first generations of the Islamic faithful. Moreover, as the greatest living 
authority in this field puts it: "The truth and reality of the inner teachings of Islam 
became crystallized mostly in Sufism." (Nasr, 1991 :3) Consequently, they cannot 
be marginalized or excluded without transforming the very structure and nature of 
Islam itself. 
Nevertheless, even in the early years the contemporary tensions that presently 
exist between Wahhabism and lslamism on one hand, and Sufism and popular 
Muslim religiosity on the other were present in embryonic form: 
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While the [first] Arab-Muslim elite was engaged in conquest and empire 
[and] the legalists and the theologians concentrated upon finding out 
the rules that God had commanded to govern everyday life ... the 
mystics attempted to acquire an immediate and personal experience of 
God's reality .... In religious terms this is a quest for unity with the 
divine being; in humanistic terms it is an effort to overcome the divided 
self, to realize the truths by which life must be lived, and to attain 
wholeness of being. (Lapidus, 2002: 90) 
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Later, under the influence of gnosticism, philosophy, Eastern religions, 
metaphysics, theosophy, other non-Islamic tendencies, and profound mystical 
insight, synthesized by great teachers like Ibn al-'Arabi (1165-1240), Sufism 
began to stray far from an adherence to a literal understanding of the teachings of 
the Quran. The Sufi quest for oneness with the divine led to the marginalization of 
the observance of Muslim laws in favour of a search for states of spiritual 
intoxication and ecstasy. Communal loyalties and attention to the Shariah and 
Muslim devotions were set-aside in favour of physical (e.g., yogic) techniques and 
even the use of drugs to attain states of mystical insight. Many Muslims "sought 
to short-circuit the trying discipline of the Shariah way of life and to directly 
achieve spiritual redemption by contemplative, miraculous, and magical means." 
(Lapidus, 2002: 174) Nevertheless, some of the greatest achievements of human 
spirituality appeared at this time in the poetry ofFarid al-Din al-'Attar (d.1230), 
'Umar ibn al-Farid (d.1234), and especially Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (1207-73), giving 
"the most moving expression in verse to the profound emotions of wonder, love, 
elation, and sheer incomprehension attendant upon the mystical experience" 
(Fakhry, 1983: 255). 
Sufism also played a central role in the spread of Islam. Sufi Brotherhoods 
operating under the authority of various acknowledged Masters and observing 
diverse sets of rules, litanies, rituals, forms of meditation, etc., were particularly 
important, and lodges were established throughout the Muslim world over the last 
millennium. These adapted themselves to every aspect and nuance of innumerable 
Muslim communities, although "un-Islamic elements drawn from the folklore of 
myriad local cultures throughout the Middle East and South Asia crept into Sufi 
Practices." (Waines, 1995: 148) Nevertheless, Sufism was vital in the integration 
of "people outside the limited range of manuscript-based culture [into] the Islamic 
universe." (Ruthven, 2002: 175) Overall: 
Each [Sufi] order emphasized some element of the path and adapted itself 
to various ethnic and psychological climates in a vast world which 
included such different human types as Arabs and Berbers, Nigerians and 
Persians, Turks and Malays .... As a result, an incredibly rich diversity of 
spiritual possibilities came into being in the Islamic world. (Nasr, 1991: 
4) 
Amongst the most important Sufi orders are the Naqshbandiyyah and the 
Qadiriyyah, the two most widespread today, with a presence that extends from 
West Africa to Central Asia and Indonesia. The Mawlawiyyah, founded by Rumi, 
are very well known in the West. The Chishtiyyah spread from Afghanistan into 
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India, where they were very influential. The Shadhiliyyah was prominent in North 
africa and it witnessed a revival during the past two centuries; it was also a main 
transmitter of the teachings of Ibn' Arabi, one of the most important figures in 
Islamic spirituality and philosophy, and a specific target of Ibn Taymiyah. The 
Kubrawiyyah were important in Persia, Central Asia and India. Sufism in the 
Malay-Indonesian archipelago has a rich heritage and a prominent Sufi order there 
is the Rifa'iyyah, which is also important in Africa. 
As this resume indicates, at the dawn of the modem era, "Sufi ideas and 
idioms had penetrated all levels of society and every region where an Islamic 
presence had become established" (Waines, 1995: 153). And indeed, it was this 
situation that provoked the protests of Ibn Taymiyah and, later, Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, and more recently became the primary focus of the Wahhabi and lslamist 
onslaught. As Stephen Schwartz laments on the basis of his first hand experience 
in the Balkans and Central Asia, this animosity still exists in all its intensity: 
On one side, there was the bright aspect of Sufi traditionalism, ever 
renewed, happy, filled with love of God and humanity, seeking to embrace 
believers in the other monotheistic faiths, always committed to the 
defence of human dignity. On the other was the ugly visage of Wahhabi 
fundamentalism, narrow, rigid, tyrannical, separatist, supremacist, and 
violent (Schwartz, 2002:241). 
Wahhabi 'Religious Imperialism' 
The various works cited above describe in considerable detail how 
Wahhabism is expanding its influence in the contemporary era through "Saudi 
religious imperialism," flowing from Wahhabism's position as the Saudi official 
religious ideology, and expressing "its hostility to non-Islamic religions, ... anti-
Sufism and anti-Shi'ism." (Ruthven, 2002: 173) In his analysis of the AI Qaeda 
network in Southeast Asia, Zachary Abuza (2002: 428) observes how radical Islam 
is growing through " ... the spread of Wahhabism and Salafi Islam, the failure of 
secular education, and an increased number of religious students studying in 
Middle Eastern and South Asian madrasa (Islamic schools)." Although a 
minority, . lslamists "have shaped the agenda" ( 428). In his study of the Tali ban, 
Rashid (200 1: 199) remarks that "for 20 years the Saudis had funded hundreds of 
neo-Wahhabi parties across the Muslim world to spread Wahhabism and gain 
influence within the Islamic movements in these countries." Esposito (2002: 109) 
describes how the madras a system of Islamic schools in Pakistan developed from 
147 in 1947 to 9000 in 2002, with massive Saudi funding. Many of these are run 
by the Pakistani Deobandi movement, with "teachers with little knowledge of or 
appreciation for classical Islam and whose chief task was promoting a militant 
jihadist vision and culture." (110) Kepel (2002: 72) calls this Wahhabi offensive 
"petro-lslam" and points out that Saudi public funds derived from the oil industry 
have fmanced the construction of more than 1500 mosques around the world in the 
past half century. Indeed: "Their proliferation from the mid-l970s onward was one 
of the most visible changes in the landscape of the rapidly urbanizing Muslim 
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world." This Wahhabi dominance is given extra institutional weight by the "quasi-
caliphal role" that the Saudis enjoy as custodians of the Holy sites of Mecca and 
Medina (Ruthven, 2002:175). 
Saudi fmancial power also means that it can control key Muslim publishing 
houses, with Sufi, Shi'a and other works being suppressed: 
The Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed millions 
of Qurans free of charge, along with Wahhabite doctrinal texts, among the 
world's mosques, from the African plains to the rice paddies of Indonesia 
and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing projects of European cities. 
For the first time in fourteen centuries the same books (as well as 
cassettes) could be found from one end of the umma to the other; all came 
from the same Saudi distribution circuits, as part of an identical corpus. 
Its very limited number of titles hewed to the. same doctrinal line and 
excluded other currents of thought that had formerly been part of a more 
pluralistic Islam. (Kepel, 2002: 72) 
In this fashion, Saudi petrodollars fmanced the internationalization of Wahhabism 
and Sunni Islamism, "creating an international Islamist discourse" (Esposito, 
2002: 108). 
Major Muslim organizations like the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(established in 1969) and its subsidiary, the Islamic Development Bank and 
related organizations "have exported Wahhabi Islam to the rest of the Muslim 
world as well as to Europe and America" (Esposito, 2002: 107). The World 
Islamic League, founded by the Saudis in 1962 to offset Nasserite visions of Arab 
socialism, is also a primary Wahhabi vehicle, exercising influence through such 
bodies as the European Council of Mosques and the Islamic Coordinating Council 
of North America. It also has major influence (and even effective control) of the 
Taliban, the Deobandis and the Jama'at al-Islami, the Pakistan affiliate of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, amongst many other organizations. Bergin (2001: 59) 
describes how Osama bin Laden funnelled Saudi funds to "ultra-lslamist" leaders 
in Afghanistan, including Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, who "subscribed to the purist 
Wahhabi Islam dear to bin Laden's heart. Because of his close ties to Arabia, 
Sayyaf would receive hundreds of millions of dollars in Saudi aid." In the UK, 
Ruthven (2002: 176-7) details the struggles of British Muslims to resist Wahhabi 
domination. In the USA, Schwartz (2002: 226-7) describes the "religious 
colonialism," leading to "the Wahhabi conquest of American Islam." He 
particularly emphasizes the links between Wahhabism, the Saudi government, the 
oil industry, US politicians, and ex-politicians employed as lobbyists. He cites 
several core Wahhabi agencies in the USA, "centrally funded and directed by 
America's foreign enemies" (231 ). These include: the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, the American Muslim Council, the American Muslim Alliance, 
and the Islamic Society of North America, "which enforces Wahhabi theological 
writ in the country's 1,200 officially recognized mosques." (231) Ruthven (2002: 
177) cites an estimate that 80% ofUS mosques are "under the control of Wahhabi 
imams who preach extremism." Elsewhere, Rashid (2002:223-4) describes how 
"Saudi Islamic charities have provided Central Asia with missionaries, 
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scholarships, and Islamic literature . . . as the Saudis seek to tum Central Asians 
towards their own radical Wahhabism." Rashid (2002:10) points out that the 
ideologies of the leading militant Islamist groups are "based not on the indigenous 
Islam of Central Asia, the birthplace of Sufism (the tolerant form of Islamic 
mysticism) ... but of imported ideologies [especially] the extreme Wahhabi 
doctrine of Saudi Arabia." 
In the present era of Islamic history where the battle is between various 
formulations of Islam, drawing on a repertoire of symbols and concepts derived 
from the Islamic tradition, Wahhabism is exemplary of "a new type of Islam, one 
which is highly political, often reduced to a limited number of religious ideas, and 
stripped of the panoply of religious beliefs, practices, and symbols that have 
historically structured Muslim life." (Lapidus, 2002:872) Its empowerment 
through massive fmancial support threatens to overwhelm the many versions of 
popular religiosity that have traditionally characterized the Muslim world. Kepel 
(2002: 73) describes the Wahhabi attempt at global hegemony as follows: 
Under Saudi influence, the notion of a worldwide 'Islamic domain of 
shared meaning' transcending the nationalist divisions among Arabs, 
Turks, Africans and Asians was created. All Muslims were offered a new 
[Wahhabi] identity that emphasized their religious commonality while 
downplaying differences of language, ethnicity and nationality. 
However, as Kepel (2002: 73) observes pointedly: "This proposition did not 
necessarily correspond to any kind of demand on the part of the people to whom it 
was presented." 
Furthermore, "implicit in the Wahhabis' anti-Sufi iconoclasm [is] an attack 
on popular and non-Arab versions of Islam." (Ruthven, 2002: 174) As noted 
earlier, beyond the Arabic-speaking regions Sufism was historically the primary 
vehicle for the dissemination of Islam and the integration of indigenous cultures 
into the Muslim world. Indeed, just as important as the spread of Sufism across 
the Muslim world "was the reflection in Sufi literature of the cosmopolitan nature 
of Islamic culture .... Sufis wrote and sang their poems in nearly every vernacular 
they encountered." (Waines, 1995: 153) On the other hand, Wahhabism, 
by emphasizing the absolute primacy of the Quran, an Arabic text, and the 
Prophet's 'Arabian' sunna, while ignoring the cumulative traditions that 
had grown up over the centuries under the umbrella of Sufism with its 
multiplicity of regional variations, was in effect attacking regional 
identities, subjecting non-Arabs to Arab linguistic and religious 
authority. (Ruthven, 2002: 175). 
This is especially the case where the communities effected are already struggling to 
bear the brunt of economic and social change flowing from the impact of 
globalization. This· includes most of the Muslim world, from Africa to the 
Balkans, Indonesia and other parts of South-East, South, and Central Asia. 
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The vigorous and highly critical tenor of the various analyses of the role and 
nature ofWahhabism reviewed here might call for some degree of caution. On the 
one hand, the various authors cited support their arguments by an examination of 
many factors, including the history and ideology of Wahhabism: its position as 
the sole, official, state-sanctioned form of Islam in Saudi Arabia; its promotion 
around the world by that oil-rich state; its increasingly high profile within the 
Muslim world, especially in the poorer regions; its control over key, well~ 
resourced Islamic organizations around the globe, including the USA, with its 
increasing dominance over mosques and Islamic schools, and its· strong political, 
corporate and academic influence; its role in some of the most brutal and tragic 
contemporary conflicts in such places as the Balkans and Central Asia; its role as 
the main component of the Islamist ideology of Al Qaeda and· related terrorist 
organizations; and, especially, its theology and general world-view, which 
Schwartz (2002: 246), for example, sees as utterly nihilistic: "an amoral power 
ideology that cannot accept the coexistence of Muslim and non-Muslim 
civilizations". 
· On the other hand, despite the comprehensive and detailed nature of the case 
made by these analysts, one cannot help but wonder if Wahhabism is trUly a 
religious movement of such significance. Over the years it has not enjoyed a very 
high profile in general historical studies of Islam, and yet it is now presented as 
the ideological agent of some of the most fundamental changes underway in the 
Muslim world. Has Wahhabism somehow slipped unqer the guard of historians 
and scholars of Islam and religion generally, emerging only now to assume the 
role in contemporary global history that these analysts insist it currently has? Or 
have circumstances suddenly changed so greatly that our historical perspective has 
been transformed and we are now more clearly seeing phenomena that we 
previously ignored or were blind to? Are we witnessing the emergence of a new 
paradigm of interpretation of modem Islamic history? A brief review' of some of 
the more prominent general histories of modem Islam is instructive in gaining 
some perspective on the actual contemporary significance ofWahhabism. 
In most of these historical surveys of Islam, Wahhabism is treated as a 
comparatively minor phenomenon within the history of reform and renewal in 
Islam over the past three centuries. In his major history of the Arab peoples. Albert 
Hourani ( 1991) makes less than a dozen minor references to W ahhabism in a work 
of 550 pages. Ira Lapidus (1988) mentions it even less frequently in some 900 
pages, while the treatment provided by Esposito (1999) is similar in scope 
(although Esposito (1993) does provide a more thorough analysis, as we shall see 
below). John Voll (1999:518) locates Wahhabism within "the broad spectrum of 
movements of renewal" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bernard Lewis 
(1995), David Waines (1995), and Francis Robinson (1996) treat it mainly in 
passing. Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1957) offers some brief but important insights, 
as we saw above. Even the monumental first volume of Martin Marty's and R. 
Scott Appleby's (1991} study of fundamentalism provides only a relatively short 
discussion, where Vol 1 (1991:351) presents contemporary Wahhabism as "the 
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most enduring experiment within the broader mission" to create a modem Islamic 
society, offering "an important example for others [and] a basic repertoire of 
concepts and ideas from which modem fundamentalists draw". 
Over the past decade there was some change of emphasis within the master 
narrative of Islamic historical analysis, as the implications of Wahhabism and 
other forms of Islamism. became increasingly apparent even prior to 9/li, 
particularly after the first attack on the World Trade Center. Two examples of this 
intellectual shift can be briefly reviewed: the work of John Esposito and Ira 
Lapidus, two of the most eminent scholars in the historical study of Islam. 
Amongst his many works, Esposito published several editions of The 
Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality during the I990s, responding to actual and 
perceived threats to American interests from Muslim nations and militant Islamist 
groups. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War his outlook was liberal, progressive, 
and optimistic, explicitly denouncing "exaggerated fears of Islam as a resurgent 
'evil empire' at war with the New World Order and a challenge to global 
stability." (Esposito, I993: 4) Instead he optimistically declared that "countries in 
the Muslim world ... are undergoing a process of political liberalization or 
democratization," although challenges remain (214). He warned against "the risk of 
creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the battle of the West against a radical 
Islam," with the implication being that it is the hostile attitudes of the West and 
not the actual activities of radical Islamists themselves that constitute the principle 
danger to global order (2I5). Esposito offered several brief discussions of 
Wahhabism as one example of Islamic revivalism, "whose goal was the moral 
reconstruction of society," in face of the decadence produced by a "departure from 
true Islamic values brought about by the infiltration and assimilation of local, 
indigenous un-Islamic beliefs and practices." (50) Their solution involved 
"purification". through the militant political activity of "true believers," bringing 
about "a return to the fundamental sources of Islam," as defmed by the Wahhabis 
themselves (50). 
A decade later, following the terrorist attacks of September II, 200 I, 
Esposito (2002) reiterates his general position on Islam, which involves an 
assertion of the great achievements of Islam; a call for acceptance and tolerance of 
Islamic values, including Muslim attitudes towards women; patience with 
authoritarian Muslim regimes and continued optimism about progress towards 
some form of democracy and liberalization; promotion of the place of Islam within 
a globalized modernity; and a condemnation of United States foreign policy as a 
primary source of difficulty in the Muslim world. 
· Esposito also now provides a far more detailed discussion of Wahhabism, 
focussing on Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabism's international expansion as the 
basis of a pan-Islamic vision, its influence on Osama bin Laden, AI Qaeda, 
Jamiyyat i-Ulama-i-Islam, its role in Asia, etc. He recounts many of the events 
and developments noted above and also claims that Wahhabism cannot be simply 
equated with Islamism, asserting that a revolutionary like Sayyid Qutb, for 
example, operates in tension with the ultra-conservatism of Wahhabism. 
Nevertheless: "That being said, Saudi policies of supporting Wahhabi-oriented 
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schools worldwide have resulted in unintended consequences as witnessed by the 
Taliban-bin Laden alliance and jihadi madrasas" (Esposito, 2002: 111). He also 
devotes a considerable part of his book to discussions of Global Jihad and 
international Islamist terrorism. 
The second example of recent historical scholarship exhibiting a greater 
concern with the role played by Wahhabism and Islamism and their implications 
for contemporary Islam is the work of Ira Lapidus. Lapidus differs from Esposito 
in possessing a more profound grasp of the depth of structural change underway in 
the Muslim world, and this makes it possible for him to envisage the fundamental 
transformation of Islam presaged by the 'battle for the soul of Islam' being 
discussed here. 
In the second edition of his History of Islamic Societies (2002), Lapidus 
recasts the framework of his initial analysis, rewriting entirely his discussion of 
the past two centuries of Islamic history to emphasize an emergent "fourth phase" 
of Islamic revival. Lapidus sees this as overlapping the previous phase shaped by 
the Muslim encounter with Western imperialism. Whereas the Muslim response in 
its third phase encounter with imperialism was dominated by secularist reforms of 
varying success, the fourth phase is characterized by religious revival: 
The revival is manifested in a wave of reformist, Salafi or Wahhabi-type 
movements, which teach a return to the teachings of the Quran and the 
Prophet. It is manifest in widespread missionary, educational, and 
community-building movements, and above all it is manifest in political 
action. Muslim politics varies from pacific and cooperative to 
oppositional and violent, but the hallmark of the revival is the drive to 
create Islamic states in place of the failed secular states of the mid- and 
late twentieth century (Lapidus, 2002:xxvii-xxviii). 
For Lapidus, the revival exemplified by Wahhabism is a response to external 
forces of globalization that are breaking down the foundational, millennia-old, 
institutional structures of Islamic society. Waphabi and Islamist ideologies are 
also working to transform Muslim societies - but from within. They deploy a new 
type of highly politicized Islam, reduced to a limited number of religious ideas, 
concepts and values, and denuded of the great variety of religious symbols, 
beliefs, and practices that traditionally structured Muslim life. "In many respects," 
Lapidus (2002: 872) remarks, "the new Islam would be hardly recognizable to past 
generations." For Lapidus, it appears the ancient structures of Islamic society are 
giving way under the impact of the globalizing forces of modernity and are being 
replaced by new forms of Salafi or Wahhabi-type Islam, raising doubts as to 
"whether Muslim peoples still constitute, and will continue to constitute, Islamic 
societies as known to history" (872). 
If we compare more closely the two editions of Lapidus's book we can detect 
otheraspects of this shift in outlook. This is encapsulated in his fmal 'Concluding 
remarks', which are comparatively brief in the 1988 edition and significantly more 
extensive in the 2002 edition. In the first edition, Lapidus (1988: 915) notes while 
the past two centuries have seen profound changes, "the structures of lineage, 
religious, and state institutions .. . are enduring, though modified, templates for 
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the contemporary evolution of Islamic societies." (916) In the second edition 
(Lapidus, 2002:871), this conclusion is qualified by the observation that "today 
these ancient templates are being transformed by two fundamental forces," the first 
being integration into the global economy, and the second the emergence of 
Islainist movements noted above. Whereas Lapidus spoke initially of templates 
structuring and giving a consistent and predictable form to Islam over the 
centuries, he has now come to speak of these templates themselves being 
transformed. 
Wahhabism and Islamism are rising to prominence because change in the 
Muslim world is no. longer just occurring within the perennial structures that date 
from pte-Islamic timesand that were exemplified by the role played by Sufism 
and popular.religiosity. Instead, the primary changes that are now occurring is to 
these foundational· structures . themselves, and this appears to leave little room for 
these traditional · forrns ·of· spirituality. It is this profound shift that forms the 
context for the battle for the soul of Islam that is our concern here. 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 there has been a paradigm shift 
in the study of Islam. Prior to then there was little focus on Wahhabism as a 
significant factor in modem Islamic history, although there was some growing 
awareness in the 1990s; Now however, the analytical focus is comparatively less 
on the general history of Islam and its place within the modem world, and 
increasingly on. the ideological and material origins of the Islamism of AI Qaeda 
and other terrorist organizations and their relationship to the campaign for a Global 
Jihad. Recent texts on Islam now give Wahhabism and Islamism much greater 
significance than was granted before and their role is now subject to interpretations 
that place them much closer to the centre of modem Muslim history. This shift 
parallels the fundamental changes that have occurred in the foreign and domestic 
policies of the USA and other Western societies that are being targeted by these 
groups. It maybe characterized as the 'National Security Paradigm'. 
What has to be emphasized as this new paradigm develops is that 
Wahhabism and Islamisrn also represent major challenges to the traditional 
structures ·of Islam itself, especially in the areas of popular religiosity and 
spirituality,. which otherwise enjoy insufficient attention and may continue to be 
marginalized by· an· overwhelming concern with national security issues such as 
terrorism and the spectre of Global Jihad. 
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